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In October 1969, the artificial sweetener cyclamate was banned
from sale in the United States by Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare Robert Finch. To justify his action legally Finch chose to rely'
on the so-called Delaney Anticancer Clause of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938. Consequently, the Delaney Clause, with its
requirement that any substance producing cancer in animals be removed
from the American food supply,2 became an immediate center of
controversy. The Secretary himself criticized the Clause as an undue
restriction on administrative decision making and as an unscientific
limitation on scientific discretion.3 When asked if the Delaney Clause
should be modified, Food and Drug Administration Commissioner
Charles C. Edwards reflected Secretary Finch's view in replying:
I think the scientific community is rather well split on this issue. There are those
who feel that it is just what it ought to be right now. My personal view and that of
the FDA is that we have to have more flexibility of interpretation or we are put
into the position we were with cyclamates-all or nothing.
4
* Member of the Ohio and Washington, D.C. Bar. B.A. 1962, Ohio State University; J.D.
1969, Ohio State University College of Law.
1. "1 have acted under the provisions of. . . the so-called Delaney Amendment, enacted
eleven years ago, which states that any food additive must be removed from the market if it has
been shown to cause cancer when fed to humans or animals . . . because I am required to do
so." Announcement of cyclamate ban, Press Release of Secretary Finch, Oct. 18, 1969, at 3.
2. "[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested
by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of the
safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal. ... Food Additives Amendment
of 1958, § 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1964).
3. "But who is to say that using Fresca or some other diet drink . . . isn't better for you
than the problems of overweight or diabetes." Finch Takes Position Against Delaney Clause, FOOD
CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 10, 1969, at 3.
4. Interview with Charles C. Edwards, Commissioner, Food & Drug Administration, in U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 19, 1971, at 52.
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The contrary point of view was reported to the Surgeon General in 1970
by an eight-member committee of scientists with a staff of six senior
scientists from the National Cancer Institute. After reviewing the state
of cancer research and its relation to the Delaney Clause, the committee
stated:
It is essential to recognize that no level of exposure to a carcinogenic substance,
however low it might be, can be established to be a 'safe level' for man. . . . The
current legislation in the field of food additives, with its 'anti-cancer clause', is
based on this principle.5
Although the Delaney Clause has faced criticism from some
quarters, careful analysis of the Clause reveals that it seems to serve
well as a vehicle for the proper balancing of administrative discretion
and scientific independence on one hand with public protection on the
other; because of the analogous policy conflicts that arise in many areas
of consumer concern, the Clause represents a valuable model for all
environmental protection legislation.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF PROTECTION UNDER THE FOOD, DRUG, AND
COSMETIC ACT OF 1938
Prior to the enactment of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938, a food was considered adulterated, and therefore excluded from
interstate commerce, if it contained any added poisonous or deleterious
ingredient that might render it injurious to health. 6 This state of the
law proved to be unacceptable because, before a food could be barred
from the national market, the Government had the obligation of
showing affirmatively that it contained an added poisonous or
deleterious substance which might be harmful under normal conditions
of use. 7 In passing the 1938 Act to alleviate this problem of proof,
Congress altered food protection law in two ways, changing both
essential definitions and basic operating procedures. First, section 402(a)
redefined adulteration:
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated. . . . (2) if it bears or contains any added
poisonous or added deleterious substance which is unsafe within the meaning of
section 406. .... 8
An unsafe substance was defined in section 406(a):
5. National Institutes of Health & National Cancer Institute, Evaluation of Environmental
Carcinogens, Apr. 22, 1970 (Report to the Surgeon General, USPHS, by the Ad Hoc Committee
on the Evaluation of Low Levels of Environmental Chemical Carcinogens).
6. Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, §§ 2, 7, 34 Stat. 768.
7. 1933 FDA ANN. REP. 14.
8. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 402(a), 52 Stat. 1040.
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Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except where such
substance is required in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good
manufacturing practice shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application
of clause (2) of section 402(a). .... 9
Secondly, procedures were prescribed that for the first time allowed
poisonous or deleterious substances to be added to the food supply if
the amount was within tolerances promulgated as safe by the Secretary. 0
The new definition of adulteration, however, did not resolve the chronic
burden-of-proof problem. Under the 1938 Act the evidentiary issue was
simply moved back one step, and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) found itself compelled to show affirmatively in the first instance
that a particular chemical was poisonous or deleterious."
The difficulty in the application of section 406's test to various
chemical substances arose because the drafters of the section attempted
to define an acceptable level of human risk by utilizing the constructs
"safe" and "unsafe." From the legislative history of the Act it clearly
is demonstrable that by using the words "poisonous" and
"deleterious"'' 2 Congress sought to designate all unsafe substances.
Understood in this way, sections 402 and 406 form a legal non sequitur.
9. Id. § 406(a).
10. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1964). In approaching
the problem of control from this angle, one Senate Committee Report stated: "[T]he amount of
added poisons can be so allocated to different foods, in accordance with the practical necessities,
that on the basis of the probable consumption of the various foods consumers will not receive an
aggregate quantity of poisons sufficient to jeopardize health." S. REP. No. 493, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1934); see C. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIc AcT 113 (1938). In addition,
the Senate Committee Report commented on the tolerance provisions as follows: "In promulgating
such regulations this section requires that there be taken into account the extent to which the use
of the poison is required in the production of the article, as for example, poisonous sprays in
producing certain fruits and vegetables, and likewise, the other ways in which the consumer may
be affected by the same or other poisonous or deleterious substances. This authorization will permit
the establishment of comparatively liberal tolerances for any food where poison is unavoidable
or is required by the necessities of production, and less liberal tolerances or complete prohibitions
where it is practicable to limit the amount of poison in a particular food to [very] small quantities,
or to eliminate it completely. It will likewise afford adequate control of those situations where
irresponsible manufacturers, for some fancied or real commercial advantage, add dangerously toxic
substances to foods, as, for example, the addition of maleic acid to fats and oils to prevent rancidity
when preservation can be accomplished by observance of sanitary conditions in manufacture and
packaging and by use of refrigeration for the finished product." S. REP. No. 493, 73d Cong.,
2d. Sess. 4 (1934).
II. "Under the law as it was. . .[after 1938] the FDA could not stop the use of a chemical
simply because it was questionable, or had not been adequately tested. It was necessary to be able
to prove in court that the chemical was poisonous or deleterious." T. CHRISTOPHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FOOD AND DRUG LAW 468 (1966).
12. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1957) defines "poisonous" as
"[h]aving the properties or effects of poison;" i.e., '"[alny agent which, introduced . . . into an
organism, may chemically produce an injurious or deadly effect." It defines "deleterious" as
"hurtful," "noxious;" i.e., "unwholesome."
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The circular nature of the food protection device becomes evident when
the word "unsafe" is substituted for the terms "poisonous" or
"deleterious" as they occur in the Act. Section 402(a)(2) would read:
"A food shall be deemed to be adulterated . ..if it bears or contains
any added unsafe substance which is unsafe within the meaning of
section 406." Section 406 would read: "Any unsafe substance added
to any food, except where such substance is required in the production
thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be
deemed to be unsafe for the purposes of the application of clause (2)
of section 402(a)." Manifestly, Congress attempted to devise a formula
for establishing tolerances for poisonous-unsafe-ingredients in food.
Just as clearly, however, by defining circularly the term "unsafe,"
Congress forced the FDA to prove in each instance the poisonous or
deleterious nature of the chemicals. Often this placed the FDA in the
position of attempting to answer legally, scientific questions
unanswerable in the laboratory. The Food Safety Panel of the 1969
White House Conference on Food, Nutrition, and Health underscored
the problem, stating: "It is not possible to determine with absolute
certainty the safety of the ever-increasing number of chemicals added
to or present in our foods."' 13 Because of its definitional difficulties, the
1938 Act, like its predecessor, proved to be ineffective and food
protection problems increased.'
4
Faced with the nearly impossible task of establishing safety for
every controversial chemical, the FDA once again sought changes in
the law. Between 1950 and 1953 New York Congressman James J.
Delaney conducted a series of hearings into the nature and use of
chemicals added to the food supply. 15 From these hearings three major
pieces of legislation resulted: the Pesticide Amendments of 1954;16 the
Food Additives Amendment of 1958,1 of which the Delaney Clause is
13. WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON FOOD, NUTRITION AND HEALTH, FINAL REPORT 130
(1969).
14. The definitional problems could have been obviated if the section had been drafted
without reference to the notion of safety. For example, it could have read "no chemical substance
shall be added to any food, except where such substance is required in the production thereof or
cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice." The tolerance-setting procedure under this
language would be used to determine whether a chemical was avoidable or was required in food
production. This was apparently the very concept that Congress intended to introduce into the
law. At this stage the FDA could defer to scientific judgments of safety when they existed.
15. See Hearings on H.R. 74 Before the House Select Comm. To Investigate the Use of
Chemicals in Food Products, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951).
16. Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 559, 68 Stat. 511 (now 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1964)).
17. Act of Sept. 6, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (codified in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
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a part; and the Color Additive Amendments of 1960.18 The originally
straightforward prohibition of unnecessary or avoidable poisonous or
deleterious substances from food became the complicated prohibition
of:
(A). . . any added poisonous or added deleterious substance (other than one which
is (i) a pesticide chemical in or on a raw agriculture commodity; (ii) a food addi-
tive; or (iii) a color additive) which is unsafe within the meaning of section 346...
or (B) if it is a raw agricultural commodity and it bears or contains a pesticide
chemical which is unsafe within the meaning of 346a(a) . . . or (C) if it is, or it
bears or contains, any food additive which is unsafe within the meaning of section
348 .... n
Each piece of inserted language, covering pesticides, food additives, and
color additives, represents an involved regulatory system spelled out in
detail within the Act. The administrative discretion granted by this
machinery requires the FDA to weigh the value of each proposed
chemical use on a scale that balances the rights of the chemical producer
against those of the general public; however, proof of safety remains
the objective of each part of the Act.
The pesticide, food additive, and color laws all contain essentially
the same regulatory structure, consisting of a chemical-by-chemical
analysis by "the Secretary." This authority has been delegated to the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs for food and color additives and to
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for pesticide
chemicals. In each case the process begins by the filing of a petition
seeking a ruling by the Secretary that either allows the chemical to be
used, or bars its use, in the ways sought by the petitioner. The decision
of the Secretary comes in the form of an order that specifies the ways
in which the chemical may be properly used. Detailed procedural rules
govern the process that the Secretary and all interested parties must
follow from the time the petition is filed until the time of a final order
and dictate the way in which the appeals from the final order are to
be brought to the attention of the courts.2" It should be noted that the
complex statutory apparatus leaves unsolved the definitional problems
inherent in the use of the word "unsafe"-the same problem that caused
18. Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-617, 74 Stat. 397 (codified in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2) (1964).
20. 21 C.F.R. § 120 (1971) (pesticides); 21 C.F.R. § 121 (1971) (food additives); 21 C.F.R.
§ 8 (1971) (color additives).
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the 1906 and 1938 food protection laws to founder.21
III. THE PROOF-OF-SAFETY PROBLEM-UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS To
SOLVE IT
The Food Additives Amendment of 1958 contains three distinct
attempts to alleviate the FDA's burden-of-proof problem: (1) the
Generally Recognized As Safe (GRAS) approach that resulted in the
GRAS list of chemicals approved by the FDA for addition to foods;
2
(2) the Delaney Anticancer Clause that bans from food any substance
which causes cancer when fed to animals;2 and (3) the administrative
structure that emanated from FDA regulations designed to evaluate
item-by-item any chemicals which do not fall into either category one
21. One commentator described the Food Additives Amendment-and would probably say
the same about the other 2 amendments-as "an example of law seeking to meet the problems
that arise as side effects of scientific, economic and technological progress." T. CHRISTOPHER,
supra note 11, at 130. Actually it might be more accurate to say that these 3 amendments are
examples of legislation seeking desperately to deal with the problems created by poor legislative
drafting.
22. Section 201(s) of the 1958 Act reads: "The term food additive means any substance
• ..not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown through scientific procedures . . . to be safe
under the conditions of its intended use ...." A parenthetical insert into this section set up a
different standard for substances used prior to Jan. 1, 1958, saying "or, in the case of a substance
used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures or experience based
on common use in food." 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1964). Essentially the same provision exists in both
the Pesticide Amendment and the Color Additive Amendments. Section 408(a) of the 1954 Act
reads: "Any poisonous or deleterious pesticide chemical, or any pesticide chemical which is not
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
safety of pesticide chemicals as safe for use . . . shall be deemed unsafe . . . unless. ... 21
U.S.C. § 346a(l) (1964). Section 606(b)(4) of the 1960 Act reads: "[A] color additive shall be
deemed to be suitable and safe for the purpose of listing under this subsection for use generally
in or on food, while there is in effect a published finding of the Secretary declaring such substance
exempt from the term 'food additive' because of its being generally recognized by qualified experts
as safe for its intended use, as provided in Section [321(s)] .... 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(4) (1964).
23. The Delaney Clause for food additives is contained in § 409(c)(3)(A) of the Food
Additives Amendment of 1958, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1964). It is also repeated in the Color
Additive Amendments of 1960, § 706(b)(5)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1964) that reads: "a
color additive (i) shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use which will or may
result in ingestion of all or part of such additive, if the additive is found by the Secretary to induce
cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found by the Secretary, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of additives for use in food, to induce cancer in man
or animal. ... Whether the Delaney Clause applies to pesticide chemicals is a more difficult
question about which there is considerable controversy. The Secretary's Commission on Pesticides
wrote as if the clause could be interpreted to apply to pesticide chemicals; however, the definition
of food additives expressly excludes "a pesticide chemical in or on a raw agricultural commodity
... " Food Additives Amendment of 1958, § 201(s)(l), 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(1) (1964). Since
there is no anticancer clause in the Pesticide Amendment, it would appear that pesticides do not
fall under the prohibition of the Delaney Clause.
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or two.24 Each of these three legal stratagems endeavored to circumvent
the problem of scientific uncertainty, but only the Delaney Clause
succeeded. Before detailing the accomplishments of the Delaney Clause,
the reasons for the failure of the other two mechanisms should be
outlined for comparative purposes. Legislation that effectively controls
chemical contamination of the environment must seek to block the use
of substances that present undue risk without putting unreasonable
restraints on chemicals that provide important benefits to the public.
To initiate the GRAS procedure, the Food and Drug Administration
asked 900 scientists to comment on the safety of the first substances
proposed for the GRAS list. Rather than achieving the scientific
consensus assumed possible by the GRAS theory, the FDA harvested
a scattering of opinions. Of the 900 scientists questioned, 350 replied
with only 194 or 21 percent of the total group ratifying the entire list.
The performance of the FDA in accurately predicting the safety of
specific chemicals, even after some doubt had been raised, was similarly
imperfect. The FDA, for example, dismissed the complaints of a number
of scientists against safrole,2 vitamin D, and most notably cyclamate,
only to find it necessary to act against the challenged chemicals in
subsequent years. Thus the GRAS list mode of procedure proved to be
ineffective in discriminating between safe and unsafe substances because
the system presented the same problem of scientific choice that the
earlier acts had been unable to deal with. Where the Agency earlier had
tried to choose which chemicals and which foods were safe, it now
foundered trying to choose which scientists were the best judges of safety.
An FDA memorandum spelled out the guiding principle of this choice.
In our final evaluation of the safety of a substance we have taken cognizance of the
fact that all opinions are not of equal value and thus have weighed most heavily the
opinions of scientifically recognized and often world-renowned experts.26
Under this pick and choose procedure the basic GRAS list grew to
approximately 700 items with various loopholes and exceptions allowing
as many as another 1,000 items to be treated as on the GRAS list by
the FDA. Food manufacturers, faced with a minimum of an estimated
24. This is the regulatory procedure outlined above and is essentially the same for pesticide
chemicals, food additives, and color additives.
25. "Safrole" is the ingredient used for flavoring in root beer.
26. FDA Div. of Pharmacology & Food Memorandum, Sept. 2, 1959.
27. The details of this situation are spelled out in J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST, THE
RALPH NADER STUDY GROUP REPORT ON FOOD PROTECTION AND THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION 153-59, 162-63 (1970).
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two years of study28 before gaining permission to market a new additive,
sought to achieve recognition of their chemicals through the loopholes
in the GRAS list procedure. By the end of 1970 the situation had become
so unwieldly that the Agency moved to revise the entire GRAS
procedure by attempting to reintroduce suspect chemicals currently on
the GRAS list into the chemical-by-chemical investigation. 9
As previously noted, the chemical-by-chemical procedure relies on
the ability of scientists to distinguish safe from unsafe substances. That
portion of the Act authorizing this approach states: "No. . . regulation
shall issue if a fair evaluation of the data before the Secretary-(A) fails
to establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the
conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe. ... "-0
All parties to the discussion of the 1958 Food Additives Amendment
accepted the assumption that safety or the lack of it could be established
in each case, and accordingly, the FDA issued a regulatory definition
of safety that said, "'Safe' means that there is convincing evidence
which establishes with reasonable certainty that no harm will result from
the intended use of the food additive. ' 31 Faced with reviewing the GRAS
list that contained many items for which scant, controversial, or no
evidence existed, the FDA, interestingly enough, moved to redefine
"safe." "' Safe' must be understood to connote that the Food and Drug
Administration, after reviewing all available evidence, can conclude
there is no significant risk of harm from using the substance as
intended. 2 This second definition allows untested or only partially
tested chemicals to be added to the food supply, while the former
definition required the initial presentation of some convincing evidence
of safety. The change in definition represents a significant erosion of
the safety concept, one of the unfortunate side effects that results when
a regulatory agency expected to enforce policy is required to resolve
scientific conflicts. The Surgeon General's committee on low-level
28. Hearings on H.R. 8112 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 60 (1957-58) (remarks of FDA Comm'r Larrick).
29. Food Additives, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,623 (1970).
30. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, § 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1964).
31. 21 C.F.R. § 121.1(i) (1971) (emphasis added). Commenting on the safety provision,
Charles Wesley Dunn, the General Counsel for the Grocery Manufacturers of America stated:
"Such [a] requirement is basically a pretesting one for new food additives. . . . Whereas the FDC
Act now prohibits a food that is unsafe, this prohibition normally applies after the food is sold
and consumed, and its enforcement may be long delayed for various reasons. . . . [m]oreover in
such an enforcement proceeding the Government has the burden of proving that the food is unsafe,
whereas this requirement would instead compel the manufacturer of a food to prove in advance
that it is safe." Hearings on H.R. 8112 supra note 28.
32. Food Additives, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,623, 18,624 (1970) (emphasis added).
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carcinogens demonstrated the folly of the FDA's new safety definition.
It reported that bioassays are incapable of detecting carcinogenic effects
below the ten percent level, and therefore so-called negative data are
grossly inadequate to give assurances of safety for man.3 3 More
importantly, leading scientists 34 are increasingly making this same
argument about the chemicals related to genetic problems, birth defects,
and mental retardation. The current FDA attempt to revise the GRAS
list and its redefinition of safety concede the difficulty of giving empirical
meaning to the term "unsafe" while the whole area is the subject of
scientific controversy. This difficulty is further demonstrated by the
FDA's new interim regulation policy.
If after a responsible and substantial question of safety has been raised regarding a
substance previously listed as GRAS the main weight of the scientific evidence
still indicates safety (at least within certain limits), an interim food additive regu-
lation will be proposed. This will permit further scientific investigations to define
the conditions of safe use for a food additive regulation of indefinite duration.3
This statement seems to be at variance with the provision of the Act
that requires that "no such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation
of the data before the Secretary-(A) fails to establish that the proposed
use of the food additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in
the regulation, will be safe . . .36 The FDA, however, argues that
an interim time period serves merely as one more condition of use under
the law, and this interpretation has been upheld in federal district court.3 7
The practice of issuing interim regulations further erodes the assumption
that the food supply contains only safe chemicals.
The FDA, after 65 years of failure, still struggles to solve scientific
controversies about safety with legal tools. One apparently overlooked
fact underlies this struggle. When scientists agree that a chemical is
either safe or unsafe, no controversy about its use erupts. Only when a
scientist challenges the label of "safe" attached to a chemical or class
of chemicals by other scientists does the FDA engage its balancing
mechanism. Otherwise chemicals enter the food supply virtually
33. National Institutes of Health & National Cancer Institute, supra note 5.
34. Examples of scientists who are concerned with chemicals causing birth defects and genetic
damage include Dr. Samuel Epstein of Case Western Reserve University, Dr. James Crow of the
University of Wisconsin, Dr. John W. Olney of Washington University, and Dr. Marvin Legator
of the FDA.
35. Food Additives, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,623, 18,624 (1970).
36. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, § 409(c)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (1964).
37. The oral opinion of Judge Gerhard Gesell was reported in FooD CHEMICAL NEWS, July
12, 1971, at 17.
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unnoticed. As a result, whenever it enters a controversy the FDA
overrules one set of scientifically supported arguments with a legal or
regulatory judgment.
The twisting and turning of the food and drug laws since 1906
resulted from using the word "safety" to denote two distinct concepts.
First, it includes the scientific observation that a chemical additive or
food does not cause damage to humans. Secondly, it includes the policy
judgment that even though a chemical might cause injury to a human,
the damage it causes is outweighed by the benefits it imparts. Only the
Delaney Clause of the Food and Drug Act escapes this pitfall by
avoiding any reference to either concept of safety. Instead, it allows
scientists to ascertain the degree of risk presented by the use of a
particular chemical and assigns policy makers the task of judging
whether the scientifically defined risk is acceptable to society. For this
reason it serves as a model for all other environmental protection
legislation. Despite the simple logic underlying the Clause, and despite
its ready applicability to other regulatory fields, this Clause has often
been misunderstood by regulators and the public alike.
IV. THE DELANEY CLAUSE: A MODEL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION LEGISLATION
A. Misunderstanding the Delaney Clause
Food and Drug Commissioner Charles C. Edwards restated
accurately the misunderstanding of the Delaney Clause when he said
of it:
My personal view and that of the FDA is that we have to have more flexibility of
interpretation or we are put into the position that we were with cyclamates-all or
nothing. And it becomes a highly emotional issue at that point, allowing no discre-
tion on our part or anyone else's.u
This statement implies that but for the Delaney Clause the FDA would
have allowed cyclamates to remain in the food supply in some amount
even though this chemical causes cancer in rats. The Commissioner's
characterization of the Delaney Amendment as a usurpation of
administrative discretion is incongruous because other parts of this food
protection law, although operating more slowly than the anticancer
clause, also would have required cyclamates to be completely banned
from the food supply. At the onset of the cyclamate controversy, the
chemical was generally recognized as safe by the FDA. After a
38. See Interview with Charles C. Edwards, supra note 4.
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substantial safety question was raised, the Secretary officially removed
cyclamates from the GRAS list. At this point the law, absent the
Delaney Clause, requires that the chemical be shown to be safe before
a petition can be granted allowing its addition to food. 9 In view of the
state of scientific knowledge about cancer causing substances, it is
unlikely that cyclamate could have met this burden of proof; therefore,
the chemical could have been removed from the food supply without
reference to the Delaney Clause. In fact, some of the most vigorous
critics of the Delaney Clause call it an unnecessary duplication of
already existing authority.
When the Commissioner asks for "discretion" to decide when a
chemical that causes cancer in animals can still be used in food for man,
he is asking for the discretion to decide an issue that thousands of cancer
researchers have been unable to resolve. The dangers of this position
were put forth accurately by former Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, Arthur S. Flemming:
The rallying point against the anticancer provision is the catch phrase that it takes
away the scientist's right to exercise judgment. The issue thus made is a false one,
because the clause allows the exercise of all the judgment that can safely be exer-
cised on the basis of our present knowledge. The clause is grounded on the scientific
fact of life that no one, at this time, can tell us how to establish for man a safe
tolerance for a cancer-producing agent.
As I pointed out in my original testimony, the opposition to inclusion of an anti-
cancer clause arises largely out of a misunderstanding of how the provision works.
It allows the Department and its scientific people full discretion and judgment in
deciding whether a substance has been shown to produce cancer when added to the
diet of test animals. But once this decision is made, the limits of judgment have
been reached and there is no reliable basis on which discretion could be exercised in
determining a safe threshold dose for the established carcinogen. 0
The fact that the country's highest food and drug officials still believe
that this kind of discretion should be granted demonstrates the need for
more effective policy setting by Congress.
39. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, § 409(c)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1964).
40. Hearings on H. R. 7624 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 501 (1960). The members of the committee that reported
to the Surgeon General on low levels of environmental carcinogens considered the arguments made
by Secretary Flemming so important that they inserted the entire statement of the former Secretary
in their report. Following the statement they added this note: "The scientific basis on which the
19711
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B. Expanding the Delaney Clause to Other Areas of Environmental
Protection Legislation
From the FDA's experience in attempting to differentiate between
safe and unsafe substances, it seems apparent that in order to shield
the environment from further chemical contamination, the policy issues
and the scientific issues, although interrelated, must be approached
separately. The report to the Surgeon General on environmental
carcinogens clearly defined the problem and divided the scientific and
policy responsibility. "While science can provide quantitative
information regarding maximum risk levels, the task of ultimately
selecting socially acceptable levels of human risk rests with society and
its political leaders. ' 41 The role of the scientist is to describe physical
phenomena-this chemical caused lesions in mouse brains under these
conditions; that chemical caused cancer when fed to mice in certain
quantities; those chemicals caused birth deformities when injected into
chickens in designated amounts at certain ages. Scientists can offer less
definite but still important scientific opinions on the degree to which
damage to man can be predicted from damage to animals. Without
knowing the levels of risk that society will tolerate, however, scientists
cannot effectively differentiate between "safe" and "unsafe"
substances.
Congress, on the other hand, taking into consideration the certainty
or relevancy of the scientific findings, must set broad policy guidelines.
Several issues suggest themselves as important for the consideration of
the nation's policy-makers. Which purposes served by chemicals are
worth the apparently increasing risk of their use in foods? Resolving
this issue involves a reassessment of the "required for" or "unavoidable
in" food production concept of section 406. If additional uses of
chemicals are found necessary to improve the food supply, these
concepts could be expanded. 42 In addition, Congress must determine
Government's position was established in 1960 remains valid. The progress of knowledge in
carcinogenesis in the last decade has only strengthened the points made in Secretary Flemming's
testimony." National Institutes of Health & National Cancer Institute, supra note 5.
41. National Institutes of Health & National Cancer Institute, supra note 5, at 14.
42. The Food Safety Panel of the White House Conference suggested some additional criteria
that Congress might consider: "[That] no additional chemicals should be permitted in or on foods
unless: They have been shown with reasonable certainty to be safe on the basis of the best scientific
procedures available for the evaluation of safety and meet one or more of the following criteria:
1. They have been shown by appropriate test to be significantly less toxic than food additives
currently employed for the same purpose.
2. They significantly improve the quality or acceptability of the food.
3. Their use results in a significant increase in the food supply.
4. They improve the nutritive value of the food.
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which extrapolations from animals can be made to man. In the cancer
area it is policy that if a chemical affects animals it will not be given
to humans. 3 This practice was adopted because under the present state
of scientific knowledge a safe tolerance for man of a substance that
produces cancer in animals cannot be established." What chemicals
should be added to the "zero tolerance" list now containing only
carcinogens? Already chemicals causing birth defects and genetic
damage in animals have been suggested for addition to the list. Congress
must collect and review the evidence that other irreversible biological
damage can be caused by chemicals and set a "zero tolerance" policy
for these areas where necessary.
The Delaney Clause can serve as a model for environmental
protection legislation because it delegates to scientists the responsibility
for making scientific judgments and to Congress the task of making
policy decisions. The scientist, after an analysis of all technical data,
specifies the degree of risk that would result if any amount of known
carcinogens were allowed in the nation's food supply; Congress, after
considering all other relevant information, determines that the risk is
unacceptable. The FDA is then charged with the responsibility of
removing carcinogenic chemicals from the food supply. The procedure
outlined for developing a new food protection or any other
environmental protection law should not include any effort to define
"safety." Rather, scientists should describe a degree of risk as
accurately as science allows. Congress then should decide whether that
risk is worth taking. To begin the development of a more effective food
protection law, the report to the Surgeon General enunciated one
additional fundamental point. "Chemicals should be subjected to
scientific scrutiny rather than given individual 'rights': they must be
considered potentially guilty unless and until proven innocent. '4 5 The
authors of that report directed their comment at carcinogens, but the
same observations may now be made for chemicals relating to genetic
damage or birth defects.
V. CONCLUSION
The nearly uninhibited addition of chemicals to the environment
for the last several decades lies at the heart of the so-called
5. Their use results in a decrease in the cost of food to the consumer." WHIE House
CONFERENCE ON FOOD, NUTRITION AND HEALTH, supra note 13.
43. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, § 409(c)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1964).
44. National Institutes of Health & National Cancer Institute, supra note 5, at 15.
45. Id. at 15.
1971]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
environmental crisis. To control this use of chemicals requires a new
combination of scientific expertise and legal policy. The drafters of the
Delaney Clause of the current food protection law were successful in
writing into that legislation a proper balancing of the policy function
and the scientific function. Congress heard scientists describe the level
of known and unknown risk associated with cancer causing chemicals.
It set the policy that no chemical known to cause cancer in animals
would be allowed in the food supply. The regulatory agency was assigned
the scientific task of distinguishing those chemicals that cause cancer
in animals from those that do not. The Delaney Clause sets clear public
policy and allows complete scientific freedom.
Congress, by setting the public policy concerning cancer causing
chemicals itself and by assigning the scientific implementation of that
policy to the agency that regulates food, established a procedure for
effectively weighing environmental dangers and acting to prevent them.
All chemicals-whether they be pesticides in or on foods, industrial
chemicals that contaminate the water or air, hazardous substances that
are used in the home, or any one of hundreds of other environmental
pollutants used in this society-must be subjected to a rationalized
policy. Congress, guided by the state of scientific knowledge, must place
limits on the risks to be assumed by society; the appropriate regulatory
agency, again guided by scientific research, must not allow that
established risk to be exceeded. This is the principle of the Delaney
Clause, and for this reason the Delaney Clause serves as a model for
other environmental legislation.
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